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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction for the Court of Appeals is conferred statutorily
by U.C.A. 77-35-26 and Rule 26 Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
which gives the Utah Court of Appeals jurisdiction over appeals
from final judgments in the Seventh Judicial District Court.
I

STATEMENT OF CASE
The Appellant filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and
Post Conviction Relief on the 16th day of April, 1992. The state
filed a Motion To Dismiss and Memorandum in Support of Motion To
Dismiss the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on the 30th day of
April, 1992. The Motion To Dismiss was based upon the ninety day
statute of limitations set forth in Utah Code Ann. 78-12-31.1,
which bars any Petition for writ of Habeas Corpus not filed within
a ninety day period from the date that the cause of action accrued.
The Appellant filed a Motion For Extension of Time with the
District Court on the 19th day of May, 1992.

The District Court

granted said extension on the 28th day of May, 1992.
The Appellant filed an Objection and Request For Hearing on
the 5th day of June, 1992, wherein, he specifically stated why the
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Post Conviction Relief
should not be barred by the ninety day statute of limitations. The
Memorandum in Response to the Petitioner's Objection was filed on
3

the 10th day of June, 1992.
The District Court granted the Attorney General's Motion To
Dismiss on the 12th day of June, 1992, and the final Order was
entered therein on the 22nd day of June, 1992.

The Appellant's

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Post Conviction Relief was
based upon the theory of ineffective assistance of counsel at the
time of Petitioner's plea agreement in his criminal case and at the
time of sentencing.

The Appellant's Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus was also based upon an affidavit which he had obtained from
a co-defendant who had been
Petitioner
prosecution.

and

for

the

an adverse witness

state

in

his

against

associated

the

criminal

Said affidavit rescinded an incriminating statement

which had been previously made by said co-defendant.
On or about October 5, 1992, Appellant filed a brief with the
Utah Court of Appeals.
On or about October 16, 1992, the Appellee file a Motion for
Extension of Time to respond to Appellant's brief.

Appellee's

Motion for Extension of Time was granted until December 7, 1992.
On or about November 18, 1992, Angela F. Micklos, Assistant
Attorney General filed a Substitution of Counsel.
On or about December'7, 1992, Brief of Appellee was filed.

4

II
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A.

The Appellant concedes that three month limitation on the
filing of petitions for writs of habeas corpus is a
procedural limitation,

B.

The State Constitution gives the Supreme Court
the right to impose procedural limitations,

C.

Utah Code Annotated §78-12-31,1 does not
contain any provision for excusable delay,

D.

Utah Code Annotated §78-12-31,1 was
intended to apply to the Appellant,

not

III
ARGUMENT
A.

The Appellant concedes that three month limitation
on the filing of petitions for writs of habeas corpus
is a procedural limitation.

In Appellee's brief p.5 and 6, it is argued that the Courts
can impose a procedural limitation on the filing of a Petition For
Writ of Habeas Corpus. In the very first paragraph of Appellant's
argument in his Brief on p.9 he states that he acknowledges that
the State may apply a reasonable procedural limitation on the
filing of Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

However, the

appellant argues that a ninety day procedural limitation is much to
restrictive and unreasonable, and thus, is unconstitutional.
Appellee states also in the first paragraph on p.6, of his
5

brief, "Petitioner claims that §78-12-31.1 is not a procedural
limitation,

implying

that

§78-12-31.1

suspends

the

right

to

Petition the Court for Habeas Corpus relief." The appellant, at no
time, in his brief states that §78-12-31.1 is not a procedural
limitation, and certainly does not imply that because it is a
statute of limitation, it suspends the right to petition the Court
of habeas corpus relief.

To the contrary, appellant agrees that

if a procedural limitation provides for a reasonable time period in
which to file a Writ of Habeas Corpus, it can, in fact be
constitutional.
B.

The State Constitution gives the Supreme Court not the
Legislature the right to impose procedural limitations.

The appellee, apparently, in response to appellant's brief,
states that the Utah Constitution does not give the Supreme Court
the right to impose procedural limitations on the filing of actions
such as the Petitions For Writs of Habeas Corpus. It specifically
gives examples of what it interprets the Supreme Court's rules
adoption powers to include, i.e. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules of
Evidence, and Rules of Appellate Procedure.

However, appellee

fails to point out that the Rules of Civil Procedure and Rules of
Appellate Procedure, contain many procedural limitations on the
filing of actions.

For example:

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,

Rule 3, states that a civil action is) commenced by either the
6

filing of a complaint or by the service of a summons.

However, if

the action is commenced by service of a summons, the complaint must
be filed within 10 days of said service or the action is dismissed
and court has no more jurisdiction thereof.

Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, Rule 4, states that when an civil action is commenced by
the filing of a complaint with the court, the summons and copy of
the complaint must be served upon the defendant within 120 days
after the filing the complaint or the action shall be dismissed on
application by any party or on the Court's own initiative.
The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 4 state that in a
case in which an appeal is permitted as a matter of right from the
trial court, that appeal must be filed with the clerk of the trial
court within 30 days after the entry of the judgment.

It is well

established that after that 30 day period the Appellant would be
procedurally barred from filing its appeal.
It is unclear whether Appellee is claiming that the time limit
is a statute of limitations or a procedural limitation.

On p.9 of

appellee's brief it states that, "since §78-12-31.1 is a statute of
limitations, rather than a rule it does not fall within the
boundaries of Article III, Section 4."

(Emphasis added)

In

appellant's brief, State * vs. Fowler. 752 P.2d 497 (Ariz. APP.
1987), was cited, which specifically pointed out the difference
between a statute of limitations and procedural limitation and
7

found that a one year limit on filing for post conviction relief
was procedural in nature.

It is very clear from the criteria set

forth in that case Utah Code Annotated 78-12-31.1 is a procedural
limitation and not a statute of limitations.

Consequently, the

Supreme Court, in Article VIII Section 4, is vested with the power
to enact procedural limitations and not the legislature.

The

Supreme Court has chosen not to impose a time limitation on the
filing of a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Any law which the
legislature enacts which infringes upon the State Supreme Court's
procedural powers elect not to adopt a filing limitation on a
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is unconstitutional.
If in fact, the State is arguing that Utah Code Annotated §7812-31.1

is

a

statute

of

limitations

and

not

a

procedural

limitation, then appellant argues that the ninety day limit JLS. a
suspension of habeas corpus rights and is violation of Article I,
Section 5, of the Utah Constitution. As pointed out in appellant's
brief on p.13, the Arizona Court of Appeals found that a one year
statute of limitations imposed upon the commencement of post
conviction relief was unconstitutional, because it conflicted with
the Arizona Supreme Courts power to make procedural rules.
C.

Utah Code Annotated §78-12-31,1 does not contain any
provision for excusable delay.

Appellee in its brief attempts to argue that because the §788

12-31.1 limitation does not begin to run until the discovery or the
opportunity of discovery of new evidence, it provides for excusable
delay in the filing of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

As

pointed out in appellant's brief, after discovery of the new
evidence the appellant was not able to file his Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus within the ninety day period due to circumstances
out of his control.

(i.e. he was transferred to another prison

facility and was not able to avail himself of the use of the
contract attorneys in preparing his Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus.)

Because of the shortness of the ninety day period in

which to file a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and the
cumbersome prison system in which the appellant is forced to work,
he has a legitimate excuse for missing his filing deadline.

The

timing of the discovery of the new evidence had little to do with
the delay that he incurred in the preparing and filing of his
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. If the Legislature is going to
impose such a limited period of time in which to file a Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus, in order for it to be a reasonable
limitation, the court must allow the petitioner to file his
petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus when he has legitimate excuse
for missing the filing deadline.
D.

Utah Code Annotated §78-12-31.1 was not intended to apply
to the Appellant.
9

It is interesting that the appellee cited and attached the
transcripts from the legislative hearings held on §78-12-31.1 prior
to its enactment.

A review of these transcripts indicates very

clearly that the intent in imposing the ninety day limitation on
the filing of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus had to do with the
legislature's concern that Petitions for Writs of Habeas Corpus
were being used by attorneys to avoid the execution of a sentence
imposed by the court.

In fact, on p.l of said transcripts, which

are attached to appellee's brief, it is so stated by Senator
Barlow. He specifically pointed out two particular cases, the "HiFi Case" in Ogden and "a motorcycle case" in Carbon County.
Senator Barlow goes on to state that:
This is what often happens is that the defense
attorney will know of grounds to postpone the
carrying out of a conviction, but they won't
say anything about it until after the trial.
And is not a case where the person might be
innocent or guilty.
That has already been
determined.
Now this becomes a delaying
tactic...
It is also important to note that on March 7, 1979, when this
bill was introduced into the House by Representative Sikes, he once
again referenced the Hi-Fi murders. He specifically pointed to the
long appeal process which served to delay the sentence of the
court, that of death.

He also referenced the case of Gary

Gillmore, where a Petition for Writ Habeas Corpus was filed the
evening before the execution and delayed it.
10

Based upon the transcripts of Representative and Senator who
introduced this bill, it is clear that the intent of this bill was to
prohibit attorneys from delaying the execution of the sentence of the
court, rather than determining whether or not an individual, who is
actually serving time during the pendency of his habeas corpus action,
is guilty or innocent.

In fact, it was stated by Senator Barlow that

the Habeas Corpus actions that he was specifically targeting were those
where guilt and innocence had already been determined and was not being
challenged, but that the execution of the court was being challenged.
The intent of the legislature in the filing of this bill clearly
indicates that this ninety day statute of limitations on the filing of
a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was not intended to be applied to
an

individual

such

as

the

appellant.

In

this

case,

the

only

determination that the appellant is requesting is a determination by the
Court as to whether or not he is guilty or innocent.

A hearing on the

Appellant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus would not delay the
execution of his sentence in the least.
Furthermore, the trial court has already determined that the Appellant
has a meritorious claim. (See Exhibit 1 attached hereto.)
Consequently, this statute of limitations should not be applicable
to the appellant and he should be permitted to file is Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus.

11

IV
CONCLDSION
For the above mentioned reasons the Appellant respectfully
requests that the Court strike Utah Code Annotated §78-12-31.1 as
being unconstitutional and\or permit his Petition to be heard by
the Court.
DATED this

7

day of

T&h

STEPHEN CURRIER

12

, 1993.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on the

0

day of

1993, I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, four copies of the
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the following:

Angela F. Micklos
Assistant Attorney General
Department of Corrections
6100 South 300 East
Murray, Utah 84107
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STEPHEN CURRIER,

I

ORDER OF SERVICE

I

Civil No. 92-85

Petitioner,
v.
TAMARA HOLDEN, Warden,
Respondent.

]

The above named Petitioner has filed a Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus, and the Court has reviewed the same and
finds that the matter is not frivolous, and
THEREFORE ORDERS THAT the Clerk of this Court serve a
copy of the Petition, together with all attached pleadings, on
the attorney

general

of the State

of Utah

and

the

County

Attorney of Carbon County.
Service upon the Attorney General shall be made upon
Deputy Attorney General Kirk Torgensen, 300 Fast 6100 south,
Suite 204, Murray UT 84107.
DATED this

day of April, 1992.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing

ORDER OF SERVICE

by depositing the

same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, to the
following:
Stephen Currier
UTAH STATE PRISON
Post Office Box 250
Draper UT
84 020
Kirk Torgensen
«p *,//,*
JX
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
7 O0 ' V i p C? CS °*
300 East 6100 South, Suite 204
,
Murray UT
84107
2b5" 5t3o
Gene E. Strate
County Attorney
County Office Building
120 East Main Street
Price UT
84501

DATED this

U

day of April, 1992
0

Clerk of Cou^t

